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I. INTRODUCTION
I hate these Hutus, these de-Hutuized Hutus, who have renounced
their identity, dear comrades.
I hate these Hutus, these Hutus who march blindly, like
imbeciles.
This species of naYve Hutus who join a war without knowing its
cause.
I hate these Hutus who can be brought to kill and who, I swear to
you, kill Hutus, dear comrades.
And if I hate them, so much the better.2
Simon Bikindi sang and people died. At least this is what the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) alleges in its indictment of Rwanda's
most famous singer.3 Once referred to as his country's Michael Jackson,4
Bikindi now stands accused of inciting genocide through his music.5 Although
Bikindi is also charged with directly taking part in the killings, his music and
lyrics most likely generated the charges against him.6 The international
community is divided over the propriety of putting a musician on trial for
songs that did not directly call for murder. John Floyd, a United States defense
lawyer who has worked on other incitement cases before the ICTR,7 claims
that putting Bikindi on trial for genocide was like "putting Bob Dylan on trial
for protest songs."' Others are not so kind, stating that, "Bikindi was driven
2 SIMON BIXINDI, Nanga Abahutu (I Hate These Hutus) (1992).
' Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 31-41 (June 15,
2005).
4 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Killer Songs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at 58.
Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 0 1-72-1, Amended Indictment, 40.
6 McNeil, supra note 4 (noting that "[h]ad [Bikindi] only killed, he would not be a target
of the International Criminal Tribunal, according to a United Nations official... 'He's a big fish
because of his musical compositions' ").
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment (Dec. 3, 2003).
Dina Temple-Raston, Journalism and Genocide, CoLuM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct.
2002, at 18. Arguably one of the most famous musicians in the world, Bob Dylan has never been
accused of causing deaths through his music, although he did once sing:
And I hope that you die,
and your death'll come soon,
I will follow your casket
In the pale afternoon,
and I'll watch while you're lowered
down to your deathbed,
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by pure ideological hatred," and that, "[m]ost Rwandans now feel that if his
music had been banned earlier, the tragedy would not have assumed such
catastrophic proportions."9 Regardless of personal feelings about Bikindi's
actions, he is the first person to be charged with inciting genocide through
music. This raises interesting issues regarding when it is appropriate to hold
an artist accountable for the effect his art has had on the world. Jurisprudence
related to the incitement of genocide is limited. In fact, on an international
level, only the Nuremberg trials and the ICTR have convicted persons for the
crime of incitement to genocide."0
This Note will consider the history of the crime of incitement to genocide
from its birth at the Nuremberg trials after World War II," its inclusion in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention), the interpretation given it under the statute and
decisions of the ICTR,"3 and the propriety of its application to Simon Bikindi's
case.
Part II will focus on the history of the conflict in Rwanda and the role
played by both Bikindi and his music. Part III will discuss the incitement trials
of Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche at Nuremberg. Part IV will cover the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and
the debate over the inclusion of incitement to genocide. Part V will consider
the previous decisions of the ICTR relating to incitement. Part VI will focus
on the application of these precedents to Bikindi's case. Part VII will discuss
possible implications of a conviction and possible broader reaching effects of
convicting an artist for incitement to genocide through music.
and I'll stand o'er your grave
'til I'm sure that you're dead.
BOB DYLAN, Masters of War, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963).
9 Rwanda;... no Love Song in Kigali, AFR. NEWS, July 3, 2002.
10 See Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, andRadio Stations ": The
ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA.
J. INT'L L. 139, 143 (2004) (discussing the dearth of international law in relation to incitement
to genocide and how it had its genesis at Nuremberg).
1 See id
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
13 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 2(3)(c), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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H. "DARKNESS AT THE BREAK OF NOON": 14 THE 100 DAY
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
In the 100 days between April 6 and June 17, 1994, somewhere between
500,000 and one million people were killed in Rwanda. 5 It is worth
discussing the history leading to this extreme bloodbath because it informs the
debate over whether Bikindi's songs could have incited the genocide.
Incitement as a crime is contextual; it can only be understood as the way words
functioned at the time they were uttered, or in this case sung. 6
Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Africa, but according to the 1991
census, it had the highest population density on the continent.'7 Rwanda is
made up of three primary groups: the Hutus, the Tutsis, and the Twa
pygmies." Prior to the nineteenth century, there was little ethnic connotation
associated with the labels Tutsi or Hutu; rather, the labels were primarily
related to class or lineage.' 9 In the pre-colonial period, Tutsis owned cattle, the
Hutu were primarily farmers, and it was possible to move from one
classification to another.2 ° Until 1959, Rwanda was ruled by monarchs from
the Tutsi minority.2' Hutus took part in the leadership but were limited to
middle to lower levels of administration.22
14 DYLAN, supra note 1.
"5 There is debate over the number of people who died in the 100 days genocide with
conservative estimates putting the number at 500,000 and the higher end being over one million.
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 111 (Sept 2, 1998).
16 Id. 557 ("[T]he direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its cultural
and linguistic content.... [A] particular speech maybe perceived as 'direct' in one country, and
not so in another, depending on the audience."); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 276-80 (2000) (explaining the difference between
public and direct incitement).
17 Rwanda is approximately 26,000 square kilometers, and in 1991, it had a population of
7.15 million, which equals 271 people per square kilometer. J. TEBBS, RWANDA WAR AND
PEACE?! 15-16 (1999).
IS Hutus represented 90.4% of the population, with the Tutsi and Twa representing 8.2%
and 0.4% respectively. Id. at 17.
19 There is some debate about this, but the ICTR officially adopted this position. See
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 81.
20 L.J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2005).
21 TEBBS, supra note 17, at 29.
22 Id. at 30.
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The Tutsi domination of power continued under first German, and then
Belgian, colonial rule.23 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Belgian ruling power
pursued several policies that have had a long, lasting effect on Rwandan
society. First, in order to consolidate their own power and to avoid any
conflict with the local populace, the Belgians officially began to remove Hutus
from even the low ranking positions previously available to them in the
administration. 4 Second, the Belgians introduced a national identification
card that officially, though often arbitrarily, labeled every citizen of Rwanda
as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.25
In the 1950s, the Belgian leadership of Rwanda began to allow for
democratic processes, leading to the takeover of the Hutu majority.26 The
period of 1959-1962 saw the consolidation of Hutu power under Belgian rule,
and in 1962, Rwanda became an independent country under the rule of the
Hutu president, Gr6goire Kayibanda.27 In the three years leading up to
independence, there were numerous armed conflicts between the Hutu majority
and the Tutsi minority resulting in the death of tens of thousands of Tutsis.
28
The political unrest and the violence against Tutsis also caused a large number
of Tutsis to leave Rwanda for neighboring countries.29 Some of these Tutsi
refugees, later referred to as Inyenzi (cockroaches), led armed incursions into
Rwanda resulting in backlashes against the Tutsis who remained behind.3°
The government of President Kayibanda instituted strict quotas on the
number of Tutsis that could occupy public positions.3' President Kayibanda
23 VANDENHERIK, supra note 20, at 17. Germany acquired Rwanda in 1899, and then ceded
control to the Belgians after World War I. Both countries allowed, for the most part, indirect
rule, which meant reinforcing the existing power structure of Tutsi domination. Id.; TEBBS,
supra note 17, at 31.
24 TEBBS, supra note 17, at 31-34. The Belgians may have accepted a racial theory of the
origins of the Tutsi and Hutu that theorized that the Tutsi were more advanced, physically and
mentally, than the Hutu, and thus better able to rule. Id.
25 VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 18. The ICTR noted the role that the identification
cards played in the selection of victims during the 100 days genocide. See Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 83 (Sept. 2, 1998).
26 VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 19-20.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 89.
29 TEBBS, supra note 17, at 38. The diaspora of Tutsis led to an environment of unrest along
the borders with neighboring countries where large numbers of Tutsis with a feeling of Rwandan
citizenship resided. Id.
30 VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 20.
31 The quota system was based on the percentage representation in the population. It
allocated 9% of the public jobs to Tutsis. Id.
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also banished political parties from Rwanda.32 Despite the consolidation of
power, President Kayibanda lost his hold on the presidency and was eventually
deposed by General Juvdnal Habyarimana in a military coup in 1973. 33
Habyarimana continued to consolidate power, officially establishing a one-
party state under the leadership of the Mouvement R~volutionnaire National
pour le Dveloppement (MRND).14 From 1973-1990, Rwanda increased its
Gross National Product dramatically, and, despite some human rights abuses,
President Habyarimana's rule was marked with little of the ethnic violence that
preceded his rule.35
The relative peace and prosperity was shattered in 1990 when Rwanda was
invaded by a group of refugee Tutsis known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF).36 The attack by the RPF led to a destabilization of the Habyarimana
government, and the president was forced to ostensibly open up the political
process to other political parties.37 It also led to the arrest of thousands of
Tutsis, and in attacks that foreshadowed the 1994 genocide, Tutsis were
targeted and killed all over the country.38
After the invasion, President Habyarimana began negotiations with the RPF
in 1992. 39 The negotiations resulted in the Arusha Accords of August 1993.40
The Accords were to allow for power sharing between the RPF and
Habyarimana's government and for a repatriation of Tutsi refugees.4' In order
to oversee the cease fire between the RPF and the Rwandan government, the
United Nations (U.N.) 'sent a delegation to Rwanda. 4' Radical Hutus were
32 Id.
33 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 91. General Habyarimana used the coup
to kill many political opponents, including the former president who starved to death while in
prison. Id.
34 Id. 92.
3' TEBBS, supra note 17, at 41-43.
36 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 93. The RPF was formed in Uganda from
Tutsi exiles. Id.
31 Id. 94.
38 VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 22-23.
31 Id. at 24. Members of Habyarimana's own party, the MRND, and the newly formed
Coalition pour la defense de la Rjpublique (CDR) party, were opposed to the peace process.
Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 S.C. Res. 872, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993). The United Nations (U.N.)
resolution set up the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), whose limited
mandate of monitoring the cease fire and reporting violations would prove to be a crippling
deficiency when it came time to intervene during the 100 days. See SCOTT PETERSON, ME
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virulently against the Arusha Agreement, and the tension between Hutu and
Tutsi increased to a fever in the final months of 1993.43
The media played an increasingly important role in the spread of anti-Tutsi
sentiment in the time leading up to the 1994 genocide. In 1990, the paper
Kangura, founded by Hassan Ngeze, published a series of articles that
essentially called for the full destruction of the Tutsi people within Rwanda.'
In 1993, the Radio T9levision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), a radio station
founded by President Habyarimana's political party with him as its primary
shareholder, began broadcasting vitriolic attacks on Tutsis.45 Throughout the
100 days, RTLM continued to broadcast attacks on Tutsis, including the names
of Tutsi and Hutu political opponents who were subsequently killed.46 As will
be discussed later, RTLM was the key promoter of Simon Bikindi's music, and
he was a frequent guest on its programs.47
Against this backdrop of centuries of conflict, growing political unrest and
war, and the subsequently controversial Arusha Accords, Rwanda was headed
for disaster. 8 The final spark that ignited the 100 days came on April 6, 1994.
After traveling to Tanzania to discuss the Arusha Accords, President
Habyarimana, along with Burundian President Ntaryamira, was killed when his
plane crashed.4 9 Debate continues over whether the crash was an accident or
an assassination, but regardless the result was clear.50
Within twenty-four hours of President Habyarimana's death, the military
had seized power, erected roadblocks throughout the capitol, Kigali, and
executed the prime minister, along with the ten Belgian soldiers who were sent
to protect her.5 In the days that followed April 6, chaos engulfed the capitol
AGAINST MY BROTHER: AT WAR IN SOMALIA, SUDAN AND RWANDA 290-93 (2000).
4 PETERSON, supra note 42, at 271-73.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment Summary, 10-19 (Dec. 3, 2003); see also infra Part VI.
41 Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment Summary, 30.
46 Id. 28; see also Temple-Raston, supra note 8, at 18 (noting how RTLM broadcast the
license plates of cars carrying Tutsis or Tutsi sympathizers and urged them to be hunted down).
41 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 40 (June 15,
2005).
48 PETERSON, supra note 42, at 290-92. The director of UNAMIR sent several urgent
requests to the U.N. asking for more troops and for permission to investigate reports that
Rwandans were stockpiling arms, but was denied based on the limited mission of the U.N.
delegation. Id.
49 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 106 (Sept. 2, 1998).
'0 There is speculation that the president was killed by a missile launched by the RPF, but
the investigation into the crash is ongoing. See VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 70.
SI Id. at 25-26.
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and mass killing of Tutsis, and of Hutus who supported the Arusha Accords,
began.52
In the weeks after the president's death, the killing spread throughout the
country. All over the country, Tutsis were killed while they huddled in houses
of worship, schools, and government buildings, in many cases after being
officially ordered there.53 The southern region of the country remained
relatively peaceful until the interim prime minister visited and exhorted the
local Hutus to violence against the Tutsis.54 Within days, the south was also
engulfed in all out genocide.55 Throughout the 100 days, in addition to murder,
large numbers ofTutsi women were sexually assaulted and humiliated by Hutu
men.
56
The killing continued until July 18, when the RPF was able to take control
of Kigali.57 The estimates of the number dead ranged from 500,000 to one
million.58 In the aftermath of the genocide, over two million Hutus fled
Rwanda in fear of retribution for their complicity in the killings.59
In response to the widespread violence in Rwanda, the U.N. acted quickly
to establish a criminal tribunal to punish wrongdoers. Seeking to redress the
52 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 107. Most of the killing was perpetrated
by the Interahamwe. The Interahamwe, a word literally meaning to come together to work or
kill, was originally the youth wing of the MRND, but in the years leading up to the genocide,
became an organized militia. See id. 151; VAN DEN HER1K, supra note 20, at 25-26 n. 108.
53 PETERSON, supra note 42, at 263.
54 VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 26.
55 Id.
56 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUALVIOLENCE DURING THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1996/Rwanda.htm.
5' Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-5-T, Judgment, 111.
58 Compare VAN DEN HERIK, supra note 20, at 26 (stating that the number dead was
937,000), with MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM,
NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 5 (2001) (putting the number dead at around 500,000
Tutsis and between 10,000 and 50,000 Hutus).
5' MAMDANI, supra note 58, at 234. The Hutus fled almost equally to neighboring Congo
and Tanzania. Id.
60 The Security Council adopted a resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda on November 8, 1994. See ICTR Statute, supra note 13. The U.N.'s quick response
to establish a criminal tribunal is puzzling considering the limited role that it played in
attempting to quell the genocide while it occurred. During the actual conflict, the U.N. reduced
its force from 3,000 to 200 and, along with the international community, recognized the
provisional government that was responsible for directing much of the carnage. This reactionary
response is a testament to the fundamental limitations of the law and prevention of genocide.
See Theogene Rudasingwa, Keynote Address, Fifty Years After the Universal Declaration of
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grave wrongs committed during the 100 days,6' the Statute for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda lists three types of punishable offenses:
genocide, 62 crimes against humanity, 63 and violations of common Article 3 of
the Geneva Convention.'
The Statute also lists several inchoate genocide offenses including
conspiracy to commit genocide, attempted genocide, and, the focus of this
Note, direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 65 The charge of
incitement to commit genocide is taken verbatim from the Genocide
Convention,66 and its inclusion reflects the U.N.'s recognition of the significant
role that radio, public exhortations to violence, and, potentially, Bikindi's
music played in the violence.67
Human Rights and the Genocide Convention: Lessons Learned, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 173, 188-90 (1999).
61 The main goals of the ICTR are to deter future genocide, provide accountability for
misdeeds, encourage reconciliation, and to foster peace in Rwanda. See Kingsley Chiedu
Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to Rome: The Weighty Precedents
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 273, 278 (2002).
62 Genocide is defined as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group," and includes killing members of the group as well
as attempting to prevent births or to move children of one group to another group. ICTR Statute,
supra note 13, art. 2(2).
63 Crimes against humanity are defined as murder, torture, rape, or enslavement (among
others) when committed as part of a widespread attack against a particular group. Id. art. 3. The
inclusion of rape as a charge under international law is new and was developed under the ICTR
and its judgments. See Moghalu, supra note 61, at 282-83 (noting the development of rape as
a crime of genocide and the subsequent adoption of this definition by other international courts);
Llezlie L. Green, Note, Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the Rwandan
Genocide: An Argument for Intersectionality in International Law, 33 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 733 (2002) (noting the role that propaganda and incitement played in the sexual violence
that accompanied the 100 days).
" The Statute lists several possible violations including collective punishments and the
passage of death sentences without a properly constituted court. ICTR Statute, supra note 13,
art. 4.
65 ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. 2(3).
6 Genocide Convention, supra note 12, 102 Stat. at 3046, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
67 See Green, supra note 63, at 741-47; McNeil, supra note 4 ("In Rwanda, almost no one
reads newspapers or owns a television, and radio is king."); Temple-Raston, supra note 8, at 18
(noting that the first thing an African buys when he or she gets a job is a radio).
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III. "THE GERMANS Now Too HAVE GOD ON THEIR SIDE": 68 THE
BEGINNING OF THE CHARGE OF INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS AT NUREMBERG
The Nuremberg trials that followed World War II marked the first charge
and conviction for incitement to genocide by an international tribunal.69 The
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was set up at the end of
World War II to deal with the most egregious offenders from the German
command.7" The IMT had jurisdiction over four crimes: crimes against
humanity, war crimes, crimes against peace, and conspiracy to commit all
three.71 Two of the defendants, Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche, were
charged not for their role in giving or carrying out official orders of the Third
Reich, but for the role they played in disseminating hateful ideas.72 Both were
68 BOB DYLAN, With God on Our Side, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia
Records 1964).
69 See Gordon, supra note 10, at 143.
70 Franklin Roosevelt singled out Hitler's atrocities during the war and vowed to bring those
responsible for crimes against humanity back to their home countries for prosecution after the
war. See Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 415, 424-25 (1998). The United
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France came together in London in the summer and
fall of 1945 and drafted the Charter for the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg. See
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis and Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. The twenty-one defendants were selected from the living
Nazis who arguably had held high profile leadership roles in the Third Reich. See Donna E.
Arzt, Nuremberg, Denazification andDemocracy: The Hate Speech Problem at the International
Military Tribunal, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 689, 699 (1995) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)).
" Crimes against humanity were defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds." Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 70, § 2, art. 6(c). Crimes against peace were defined as "planning... a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties." Id. § 2, art. 6(a). War crimes were described as
"violations of the laws or customs of war." Id. § 2, art. 6(b).
72 See International Military Tribunal v. Goering, Indictment, App. A, available at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/counta.htm (last visited June 19, 2007). Even though
the Nuremberg Charter did not set out incitement to commit crimes against humanity or war
crimes as a separate offense, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) had little trouble
convicting Streicher of the charge. His conviction set the stage for the future use of incitement
as a substantive charge. See Arzt, supra note 70, at 715 (discussing the cursory debate that
surrounded the propriety of convicting Streicher without proof of any actual involvement in the
crimes against humanity); Gordon, supra note 10, at 140-42 (discussing the role of the Fritzsche
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charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity.73 Streicher was found guilty and executed, while Fritzsche was
acquitted and released.74 The precedent set by both of these cases is
informative when considering the factual circumstances necessary for finding
a person guilty of incitement to genocide.
Julius Streicher was a native of Nuremberg who for more than twenty years
published the rabidly anti-semitic paper, Der Stuermer.75 Streicherjoined the
Nazi party in 192 1, and after Hitler seized power, held the rank of Gauleiter
in the northern region of Bavaria.76 However, Streicher's disturbing
personality and personal life led the Nazi Party to distance itself from him in
any sort of official capacity.77 Hitler and the Nazi Party, however, continued
to support Striecher's publication of Der Stuermer.7s The paper was filled
with "obscene cartoons,..., lists of Jewish dentists, doctors, and shopkeepers,
whom 'Aryans' were advised to avoid," and consistent, repetitive calls for the
annihilation of the Jewish race.79 Der Stuermer's anti-semitism was so rabid
that even Nazi officials were forced to distance themselves from it publicly. 0
Streicher's calls for the annihilation of the Jewish race continued well into the
war and long after he had knowledge that Germany had begun to execute the
"final solution.81
and Streicher opinions in ICTR cases).
7 Arzt, supra note 70, at 701.
4 International Military Tribunal v. Goering, Sentences, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judsent.htm (last visited June 19, 2007). Fritzsche was released soon
after his acquittal. He lived in Nuremberg for four months before he was arrested by German
authorities and convicted of being a "major offender" by the Denazification Court. He was
sentenced to nine years of hard labor, but only served four. See TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 612.
7 See Arzt, supra note 70, at 708.
76 Id. at 109. Gauleiters were political heads of provinces under Nazi rule. Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gauleiter (last visited
June 19, 2007). In his capacity as Gauleiter, Streicher oversaw the appropriation of Jewish
property and the destruction of the Nuremberg synagogue on Kristallnacht. Arzt, supra note 70,
at 709.
" Streicher was the only person charged at the Nuremberg trials who had previously served
prison time. In 1940, Streicher was convicted of corruption and sentenced to house arrest for
the remainder of the war. Arzt, supra note 70, at 710, 713.
" Streicher was allowed to continue dictating articles to Der Stuermer over the phone while
he served the term of his house arrest. Id. at 713.
79 Id. at 710-11. See also BRADLEYF. SMITH, REACHINGJUDGMENT ATNUREMBERG 200-03
(1977).
80 SMITH, supra note 79, at 200.
81 International Military Tribunal v. Goering, Judgment, Streicher, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judstrei.htm (last visited June 19, 2007) [hereinafter Streicher
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Because the calls for mass execution continued beyond 1939, Streicher's
actions were within the temporal jurisdiction of the IMT.82 In itsjudgment, the
IMT noted that Streicher's exhortations for the extermination of the Jews acted
as a poison that infiltrated the German mentality.8 3 The court concluded that
"Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in
the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly
constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with war
crimes as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a crime against humanity." 4
The Streicher judgment has been criticized for the way that the court
sidestepped the lack of a direct causal link between Streicher's statements and
genocide.85 Many commentators have surmised that Streicher was executed
more for his repulsive personality and notorious personification of all the
things evil about Nazism than for any causal link between his statements and
the execution of Jews. 6
When compared to Streicher's rabid and obscene anti-semitism, Hans
Fritzsche's public statements pale in comparison. 7 Fritzsche, the host of Hans
Fritzsche Speaks, was Germany's most famous radio announcer and a
subordinate in the propaganda ministry of Josef Goebbels. 8 Fritzsche,
however, did not directly control the content of his radio broadcasts, but served
Judgment].
82 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor
v. Nahimana, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 557, 585 (2006) (describing how although the IMT
considered activities that predated the 1939 jurisdiction of the court, Streicher's conviction was
based on his activities between 1939-1945).
83 Streicher Judgment, supra note 81.
'4 Id. The court concluded guilt despite finding that Streicher should be acquitted of the
charge of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace because he lacked any real contact with the
inner circles of the Third Reich. Id.
85 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 590 (stating that he could not "justify the Tribunal's
failure to mention.., that publication of a newspaper, however maddening and unconscionable
it may be, should be touched with criminal accusations only with the greatest caution"); Arzt,
supra note 70, at 714-16 (noting that the prosecutor barely touched on the contentious issue of
incitement as a substantive charge).
86 See SMITH, supra note 79, at 202 ("Streicher's terrible reputation obviously prejudiced
the Court against him."); Arzt, supra note 70, at 717 (claiming that Streicher was selected
because he "was a reminder of what the German people at its worst had been capable of
producing").
87 The prosecutor stated at the end of the trial that Fritzsche's statements "were no stronger
than [the] statements of American war correspondents in Washington during the war." See
SMITH, supra note 79, at 294.
88 Id. at 292.
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more as a conduit of information from Goebbels to the public. 9 Fritzsche at
times even clashed with his superiors and twice tried to ban Streicher's Der
Stuermer.9" Commentators surmise that Fritzsche was only charged by the
IMT because the Soviets, who had captured him, wanted some of their
prisoners tried.9
The weak evidence against Fritzsche, his relative obscurity, and the fact
that his superior, Otto Dietrich, who worked closely with Goebbels but was not
charged by the IMT, led to Fritzsche's acquittal.92 The Tribunal stated that
even though Fritzsche made strong statements of a propagandistic nature, the
statements were not meant to incite Germans to commit atrocities.93 The
Tribunal concluded that instead of inciting genocide, "[Fritzsche's] aim was
rather to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war
effort." 94
The conclusions that can be drawn from the conviction of Streicher and the
acquittal of Fritzsche have a great bearing on the decision of whether it is
appropriate to find criminal liability in the Bikindi case. First, the IMT was not
afraid to impose liability for incitement to genocide even with no proven direct
link between the communications and the atrocities.95 Second, the IMT was
hesitant to impose liability for a low-level bureaucrat whose statements were
directed from above. Finally, the IMT appeared to draw a distinction between
direct calls for genocide and statements that could be characterized as calls for
support of the government in the time of war.96
89 Id.
0 See id. at 294; Gordon, supra note 10, at 144.
91 SMITH, supra note 79, at 293.
92 Id.
93 International Military Tribunal v. Goering, Judgment, Fritzsche, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judfritz.htm (last visited June 19, 2007).
94 Id.
9' Although, the theory that Streicher was punished for his repulsive personality and not his
actions would seem to undercut this conclusion. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96 See Ameer F. Gopalani, The International Standard of Direct and Public Incitement to
Commit Genocide: An Obstacle to U.S. Ratification of the International Criminal Court
Statute?, 32 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87, 100-01 (2001) (discussing how the Fritzsche case supports
the contention that the IMT thought that a "conviction for incitement requires explicit calls to
commit genocide, not general arousement").
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IV. "THERE MUST BE SOME WAY OUT OF HERE":97 THE DEVELOPMENT
AND ADOPTION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
In the wake of the Nazi atrocities, the worldwide community came together
to address the newly recognized problem of genocide.9" One of the first
resolutions passed by the fledgling United Nations dealt with genocide.
Resolution 96(I) declared genocide to be a crime under international law and
requested the Economic and Social Council to perform studies necessary to
draft a convention on the crime of genocide. 99 At the behest of the General
Assembly, the Secretary General gathered a group of scholars to draft and
review the proposed Convention.'00 The proposal was reviewed by several
nations and then resubmitted to the General Assembly for debate.10' After
another round of revisions, the final language of the Convention was adopted
on December 9, 1948 by a vote of fifty-six to zero.)12 The Convention went
into international effect on January 12, 1951 and has been ratified by at least
130 counties. 1°3
97 BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia Records
1967).
" The term genocide had been coined in the 1943 work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, a
work written by the international criminal law scholar, Raphael Lemkin. Lemkin, himself a Jew
who fled Poland in 1939, would later become instrumental in spearheading the international
movement for the Genocide Convention. See SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 24-26.
9 G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96/1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
'0 The scholars included international law scholar, Raphael Lemkin; former Nuremberg
judge, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres; and Romanian law professor, Vespasian V. Pella. SCHABAS,
supra note 16, at 52.
'0' Id. at 58.
102 Id. at 80.
03 Even though the Convention has been ratified by 130 nations, its status is questionable
when considered in light of reservations made by parties to the Convention. Many of the
countries (including the United States) acceded to the treaty with reservations. Most of these
reservations were in relation to Article IX (giving jurisdiction to the International Court of
Justice in disputes between nations) and to Article VI (creating an international penal tribunal
under the Convention). In most international treaties, a country can only ratify a treaty with
reservations when those reservations have been accepted by the other signatories, but the
Convention has been construed more liberally. Under the Convention, a state may be considered
a signatory even if its reservations have not been agreed to by the other members so long as the
reservations are considered compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. However, a
party who objects to another state's reservations does not have to regard the objectionable party
as a signatory of the treaty. This awkward reservation process has led to political posturing when
it comes to recognizing another state as a signatory and a substantial amount of confusion when
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The adopted Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide defines genocide as the performing of certain enumerated acts'04
that are undertaken with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group."0 5 In an attempt to broaden the
application of the Genocide Convention beyond the temporal limitations of the
Nuremberg trials, the final draft did not limit genocide to acts that occur during
war, but stated that genocide could be perpetrated in times of peace as well.'0 6
The Convention includes several punishable offenses including genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, attempted genocide, and complicity in genocide.'0 7 One of the most
controversial aspects of the Convention is the placement of jurisdiction for
trials related to genocide within the country where the killings took place.'0 8
During the drafting process, several issues were debated by the member
states,1° 9 not the least of which was the United States' hesitation concerning
it comes to deciding which states are parties to the treaty in reference to each other. See STEVEN
R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOuNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 28, 39-41 (2d ed. 2001).
"' Killing or causing serious bodily injury or mental harm to members of a protected group,
as well as other acts are listed. See Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. II.
105 The original resolution, Resolution 96(I), included political groups in its list of protected
groups. However, the term was deleted from the final adopted draft of the Convention. This
omission was one of the reasons that the United States did not ratify the Convention until almost
forty years after its passage by the General Assembly and included in its ratification a call to seek
an amendment to include political groups in the Convention. See Lippman, supra note 70, at
482 n.435; see also Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law: Protection of Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612 (1986) (discussing
the rest of the reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate with the ratification of the
Convention).
106 Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. I. Ad hoc tribunals enforcing the Genocide
Convention, like the IMT Nuremberg, tend to limit their jurisdiction to specific dates. See, e.g.,
ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. 7 (limiting jurisdiction to crimes committed between January
1, 1994 and December 31, 1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, art. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993) (limiting temporal jurisdiction to events that occurred after January 1, 1991).
107 Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. III.
1o Id. art. VI (stating that people who are charged with genocide shall be tried by a
"competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed").
109 A series of debates occurred between member nations concerning several aspects of the
final draft of the Genocide Convention. Among those were (as mentioned above) the failure to
include political groups among those protected, the placement ofjurisdiction within the countries
where the genocide took place, and the inclusion of the crime of cultural genocide. See
SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 51-81; see also Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the
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the inclusion of the crime of incitement to genocide."' The United States has
possibly the most expansive protections of the freedoms of speech and
expression, and during the drafting process, expressed several concerns about
the inclusion of incitement as a punishable offense."' Initially, the United
States proposed an amendment that provided incitement only be punishable
when, as under its domestic law, the statement poses a clear and present danger
of interfering with the rights of others." 2 However, the United States later
changed its position and sought to have the incitement provision eliminated
totally from the Genocide Convention." 3 The U.S. delegation feared that the
inclusion of incitement would interfere with the freedom of the press. "- The
United States was supported by several other nations, but it faced strong
opposition from countries such as Poland, which argued that the incitement
charge was necessary for the Convention to have any sort of preventive
effect." 5 The Polish position eventually carried the day, and the United States
abstained from the ratification vote for Article III in protest of the inclusion of
the incitement charge." 6
The United States' fears concerning the chilling effect on the press caused
by inclusion of the charge of public incitement have been highlighted by its use
in the ICTR. Although the convictions in the Media Case might well have
stood up under the United States' proposed clear and present danger standard,
Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L.
467,471-84 (2001) (discussing the various debates that were concurrent with ratification of the
Convention).
11 See SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 266-71.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 267. The Soviet Union sought the exact opposite goal and argued for the inclusion
of any propaganda that incited hatred of any protected group, but the committee rejected this
position along with the United States' request for the reasonableness/clear and present danger
standard. Id.
" Id. at 268.
'4 The U.S. delegation argued that,
[i]f it were admitted that incitement were an act of genocide, any newspaper
article criticizing a political group ... or suggesting certain measures with
regard to such group... might make it possible for certain States to claim that
a Government which allowed the publication of such an article was
committing an act of genocide; and yet that article might be nothing more
than the mere exercise of the right of freedom of the press.
Id. at 268-69.
"l Id. at 269.
ll6 SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 270.
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Bikindi's case may be an illustration of the possible chilling effect feared by
the U.S. delegation.
V. "A TREMBLING DISTANT VOICE UNCLEAR": 17 THE MEDIA CASE,
PROSECUTOR V. AKAYESU, AND INCITEMENT UNDER THE ICTR
In the almost sixty years since the passage of the Genocide Convention, it
has been rarely invoked and subsequently has a limited jurisprudence."t 8 The
Convention's limitations have led the United Nations to set up ad hoc tribunals
in both the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Rwanda (ICTR) in order to deal with the problem of
genocide." 9 These ad hoc tribunals provide, along with the IMT, the only
relevant precedents that could be applied in the Bikindi case. 20
The ICTR has faced three major incitement cases and handed down
convictions in all three.' 21 In the Kambanda case, the ICTR convicted the
,"7 DYLAN, supra note 1.
... See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention ofDiscrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 71, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985)
(prepared by Benjamin Whitaker) ("The fact remains that although the Convention has been in
force since 12 January 1951, any ascertainable effect of it is difficult to quantify, whereas all to
(sic) much evidence continues to accumulate that acts of genocide are still being committed in
various parts of the world."). The self-executing jurisdictional elements and the limitation on
protected groups may account for the Convention's rare invocation despite several instances of
genocide in the years since its ratification. See Lippman, supra note 70, at 465.
.9 See ECOSOC, supra note 118, 76 (noting that, "although the Convention concentrates
on punishment of the crime, this is nearly meaningless at the international level in the absence
of an International Penal Tribunal").
20 Because the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has not
convicted anyone for the crime of incitement to genocide, the discussion of relevant precedents
will be limited to the ICTR. For an interesting argument that a Serbian general should have been
convicted of incitement to genocide and war crimes because of his activities as a poet, see Jay
Surdukowski, Note, Is Poetry a War Crime? ReckoningforRadovan Karadzic the Poet- Warrior,
26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673 (2005).
121 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-
T, Judgment Summary, 86-106 (Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-
23-S, Judgment, 40(3) (Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,
Judgment, $$ 549-562 (Sept. 2, 1998). The Tribunal has also convicted and sentenced to twelve
years Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian national who worked as an announcer for RTLM, for
incitement to genocide. However, the judgment adds little to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal
other than to show the Tribunal's belief in the inherent role that radio played in inciting the
genocide. See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment, 38, 41-43 (June 1,
2000); Gordon, supra note 10, at 153.
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interim prime minister of incitement for his role in promoting the RTLM radio
station and for certain inflammatory statements. 22 In Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
the Tribunal convicted a provincial mayor who directly exhorted locals to
violence, and in the Media Case, the court found liability for journalists who
used print and radio media to escalate violence against the Tutsis.' 23 All three
of these cases are illustrative of the process for finding liability for incitement
and will be considered in turn. 124
Jean Kambanda served as the interim prime minister of Rwanda from April
8 to July 17 of 1994.125 As the de facto head of the government, Kambanda
took direct part in the commission of genocide. 26 However, his conviction for
incitement to genocide was based on his role in promoting RTLM and for
certain incendiary statements that he made. 27
Specifically, Kambanda was a direct supporter of RTLM while it was
broadcasting incendiary rhetoric about Tutsis and moderate Hutus, stating on
the air that RTLM was "an indispensable weapon in the fight against the
enemy."' 28 Kambanda's conviction for incitement was also based on speeches
that he gave during the 100 days, most specifically the statement, "you refuse
to give your blood to your country and the dogs drink it for nothing," in
reference to Hutus who refused to join in the massacre of Tutsis. 12 9 In light of
122 Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-1, Indictment, 3.12-.14, 3.19 (Oct. 28, 1997).
123 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, TT 549-562; Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-
52-T, Judgment Summary, 7% 86-106.
124 A Canadian court has also found liability for incitement to genocide in a case to determine
if Leon Mugesera (a former bourgmestre in Rwanda) could remain in Canada. Canadian law
states that a person can not remain in Canada if he or she is guilty of committing crimes against
humanity or war crimes. The ICTR rejected charges against Mugesera because his act of
incitement fell outside the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but the Canadian court
nevertheless found liability for incitement based on a speech Mugesera gave in 1992. In the
speech, Mugesera stated that the Tutsi should be sent back to Ethiopia via the river Nyabarongo,
which the court interpreted to be a coded call to kill Tutsi and throw their bodies in the river.
Following the speech, Tutsis in the area were killed. See SCHABAS, supra note 16, at 273-74,
277-78.
125 Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment, 39(ii).
126 Among the many things that Kambanda acknowledged in his guilty plea were promoting
the Interahamwe militia, who were committing the majority of the killings, through training and
armament, ordering the setup of roadblocks throughout the country, and even refusing to help
Tutsi children whose parents had been murdered, an omission which led directly to their deaths.
See id. 39.
127 Id.
121 Id. 39(vii).
129 Id. 7 39(x).
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Kambanda's position of power in the interim government, his conviction for
incitement was no surprise. Kambanda's words and material support led
directly to the death of Tutsis, and his conviction seems in line with the true
spirit of the Genocide Convention, although his direct actions essentially make
his conviction for incitement superfluous.
Because Kambanda pled guilty to the charges against him, the ICTR
included scant discussion of the incitement charge; 3 ' therefore, his conviction
did little to advance the jurisprudence of incitement. However, the case is
worth noting because Kambanda's support of RTLM and his one statement
were enough for the ICTR to justify a conviction for incitement.
In contrast to the Kambanda case, the case of Jean Paul Akayesu did
significantly advance the jurisprudence of incitement. Akayesu was a
bourgmestre of the Taba commune. 3' On April 19, 1994, Akayesu gave a
speech to a crowd of people, which included members of the Interahamwe
militia. ' In the speech, Akayesu exhorted the crowd to unite to eliminate the
common enemy, which he referred to as the accomplices of the Inkotanyi.
33
Akayesu also read a list of names of people believed to be supporters of the
RPF.134 Within hours, the killing of Tutsis in Taba commenced.1
35
In finding Akayesu guilty of incitement to genocide, the Tribunal defined
several key concepts that will bear on the disposition of Bikindi's case.'
36
First, the Tribunal found it necessary to define the term "incitement." The
Tribunal defined "incitement" as "directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to
commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats... or through
the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material ... or
through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other means
of audiovisual communication."' 137 Next, the Tribunal looked to a French
130 See id. T 40(3).
131 Prior to his exhortation to violence, Akayesu was considered an excellent public official.
See Jamie A. Williamson, The Jurisprudence of the International Criminal TribunalforRwanda
on War Crimes, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 51, 62 (2005).
132 The crowd had formed around the dead body of a young Interahamwe member. See
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 673 (Sept. 2, 1998).
133 Id. The term Inkotanyi literally meant resistance fighter, and like Inyenzi, was a
derogatory term for supporters of the RPF and Tutsis in general. Id. T$ 147-149.
134 Id. 673.
135 Id. 675.
136 The Tribunal began its discussion of incitement by mentioning the conviction of Julius
Streicher at the IMT for Nuremberg and noting that incitement was included in the Genocide
Convention because of its crucial role in the planning of genocide. Id. IT 550-551.
137 Id. 559. The tribunal cobbled together this definition from both common and civil law
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definition and defined the word "public" as words that are "spoken aloud in a
place that [is] public by definition."'' 8
The Tribunal also undertook the important task of defining the word
"direct." According to the Tribunal, in order to be direct incitement, the
statement must be more than a "mere vague or indirect suggestion," and there
must be definite causation between the incitement and a specific offense.'39
However, the Tribunal noted that the directness of the statement can only be
considered in light of its linguistic and cultural content. 4 In order to prove
the directness of Akayesu's statements, the prosecution called a linguistics
expert, Dr. Mathias Ruzindana, who testified that Akayesu's reference to
exterminating the Inkotanyi would be understood as a call to kill all Tutsis. 4 '
The prosecution also called lay witnesses who testified that the statement was
understood by the average person to be a call to commit genocide.'42
The final important discussion in the Akayesu case came in the Tribunal's
treatment of the mens rea necessary to support a charge of incitement. 43 In
order to be guilty of incitement to commit genocide, the Tribunal reasoned that
the inciter must have the intent to destroy the group and a desire "to create by
his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit such a crime in the
minds of the person(s) he is so engaging."'' 44 This definition of mens rea
mirrors the one set out in Article II of the ICTR Statute, and confirmed the
need for specific intent with the crime of incitement. 14
definitions of incitement, as well as relevant Rwandan law. See id. 555.
13' Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 556.
"39 Id. 557. This statement seems to be in line with the conviction of Streicher and the
acquittal of Fritzsche. See infra Part III.
14' Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 557. The Tribunal noted that the inciting
remark could be implicit and that "a particular speech may be perceived as 'direct' in one
country, and not so in another, depending on the audience." Id.
141 Id. 673(iv).
142 Gopalani, supra note 96, at 105. Akayesu himself stated that the audience would take his
statements to mean all Tutsis, not merely RPF sympathizers. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-
T, Judgment, 709.
141 It should be noted that the Tribunal did address the issue of whether an incitement charge
could be supported when genocide in fact did not occur. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,
Judgment, 561. However, the issue of whether incitement is an inchoate offense was merely
rhetorical given the scope of the Rwandan genocide. The Tribunal's cryptic discussion of this
topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
'44 Id. 560.
's See ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. II (stating that in order to be guilty of genocide a
person must act with the intent to destroy all or part of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group).
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The final important case for the purposes of this Note is the case of
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, commonly
referred to as the Media Case.16 The Media Case represented the first time
since the conviction of Julius Streicher that members of the media were
convicted of incitement to genocide. 1
47
Hassan Ngeze was the founder and publisher of the paper Kangura, which
literally translates to "wake others up.',148 Kangura was responsible for the
publication of the Hutu "Ten Commandments," which called for Hutus to
"cease feeling pity for the Tutsi!"; for publishing an issue with a drawing of
a hand holding a machete with the caption, "[w]hat weapons shall we use to
conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?"; and for numerous other anti-Tutsi
articles.1 49 Kangura was not published during the 100 days, but the Tribunal
found direct links between the paper and RTLM that continued throughout the
1994 genocide.150
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza were both involved with
RTLM. Nahimana was a former history professor and head of the Rwandan
Office of Information who was dismissed from that post because of falsely
reported information that led to a massacre of Tutsis in 1992.1" After his
dismissal, Nahimana started a steering committee in order to establish a radio
station that reflected his radical ideals.' With the help of President
Habyarimana and other officials, Nahimana founded RTLM and began
broadcasting vitriolic attacks on Tutsis."' Barayagwiza was a lawyer and
government official who acted as legal counsel for RTLM and as a liaison
between Nahimana and Ngeze who reportedly did not work well together.
154
146 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment Summary (Dec. 3, 2003).
"4 See Recent Case, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (the Media Case),
Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (Int 'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003), 117
HARV. L. REv. 2769, 2769 (2004).
148 Gordon, supra note 10, at 156.
" See Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment Summary, 10-17. The similarity
between Kangura and Der Stuermer should not be overlooked.
1o Kangura and RTLM co-sponsored a competition calling on listeners of RTLM to identify
their favorite past issues of the paper. The competition was initiated in order to reacquaint
listeners with ideas expressed in past issues of the paper. See id. 19.
151 Gordon, supra note 10, at 159.
152 Id.
' DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: THREE RWANDAN JOURNALISTS, THEIR
TRIAL FOR WAR CRIMES, AND A NATION'S QUEST FOR REDEMPTION 29-30 (2005).
154 Gordon, supra note 10, at 166.
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In the time leading up to the 100 days, RTLM broadcast several brands of
hateful rhetoric, including statements equating the terms Inyenzi and Inkotanyi
with Tutsis, as well as direct attacks on specific members of the Tutsi
community.155 During the massacre, RTLM became more direct, calling for
the extermination of all Tutsis and sending out a call for the recruitment of
100,000 Hutus to kill all of "one ethic group," a call which, at the time, was
understood to mean the destruction of all Tutsis living in Rwanda.,5 6 RTLM
continued to broadcast throughout the 100 days and, once the RPF took back
Kigali, moved its base of operations to stay on the air."57
The Media Case established several new guidelines for incitement cases.
First, in trying to strike a balance between the inherent freedom of speech and
the desire to stop future genocides, the Tribunal rejected a speech-friendly
American model and embraced what it called the international jurisprudence
on incitement, a standard more sensitive to the prevention of discrimination.5 8
After surveying other cases interpreting the legality of hate speech, the
Tribunal adopted a four-part test to determine when a communication had
exceeded the limits of acceptable speech. The Tribunal looked to the purpose
of the communication, the actual text of the communication, the context in
which the communication occurred, and the relationship between the
communicator and the subject."5 9
In applying the test to the defendants in the Media Case, the Tribunal found
that not all of the communications rose to the level of incitement. 60 The
Tribunal noted that a speech given by Barayagwiza in which he described
discrimination that his parents faced at the hands of Tutsis did not rise to the
115 Id. at 161.
156 Id. at 162.
17 Id. at 164.
"'8 The tribunal surveyed international decisions based on several other international treaties
that deal with inflammatory speech, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. See id. at 171-72; Recent Case, supra
note 147, at 2772. For a critique of the Tribunal's use of other treaties to determine standards
for incitement, see Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 562-75 (arguing that it was inappropriate for
the Tribunal to look to hate speech treaties in order to set the standard for incitement because
those treaties are controversial and the Convention specifically rejected a ban on hate speech
when it set the standard for incitement).
'59 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment Summary, 86-88 (Dec. 3, 2003); Gordon, supra note 10, at 172-73. The
relationship between the communicator and the subject referred to whether the speaker was a
member of a political minority or a repressed group.
'60 Gordon, supra note 10, at 174.
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level of incitement because it was spoken before the beginning of the genocide,
it was not spoken with the intent to incite, and it was an expression of a
politically powerless group.' 6 ' However, the Tribunal did find that there were
numerous specific instances offered by the prosecution that did rise to the level
of incitement. 1
6 2
The Tribunal departed from its previous precedent when it came to the
discussion of the necessity of a direct connection between the inciting remark
and an act of genocide. In the Akayesu trial, the Tribunal made a direct finding
of causation between his speech and the resulting killings.'63 However, in the
Media Case, the Tribunal stated unequivocally that in incitement cases there
was no need to make a finding of a direct effect in order to find incitement."
In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal mentioned the Streicher case, noting
that the IMT did not require a direct connection between Der Stuermer's anti-
semitic rhetoric and particular instances of violence.'65
Finally, the Tribunal concluded that it could exercise jurisdiction over the
broadcasts of RTLM and editions of Kangura that preceded its temporal
jurisdiction because of its view of incitement as an inchoate offense.'66 The
Tribunal reasoned that since inchoate offenses are not completed until the acts
are completed, inciting statements that preceded January 1, 1994 could be
considered because the inciting act did not conclude until the genocide was
completed.'67
The Media Case marked a watershed moment in the jurisprudence of
incitement. The conclusions drawn by the ICTR in the Media Case will be
considered and studied extensively as future courts attempt to grapple with the
161 Id. Similarly, the Tribunal found that an article published in Kangura entitled, A
Cockroach Can Not Give Birth to a Butterfly, was not incitement even though it was filled with
hatred for Tutsis because it did not call for action by its readers. Media Case, Case No. ICTR
99-52-T, Judgment Summary, 104.
162 Id. 98-106.
163 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
" Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment Summary, T 89. The court did note that
a finding of actual direct effect could go to a finding of the speaker's purpose. Confusingly, it
states, "[t]hat the media intended to have this effect is evidenced in part by the fact that it did
have this effect." Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, 1029 (Dec. 3, 2003).
165 Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment Summary, 89. The Tribunal noted that
Streicher's words had acted as a "poison" that infected the minds of Germans, although unlike
Kangura, Der Stuermer continued publication after the killing of Jews had commenced. See
supra text accompanying note 81.
166 Media Case, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, 11017.
167 Id.
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
intricacies of the balance between free speech and incitement to genocide. The
defendants in the Media Case are currently appealing the decision. 168
With the history of the incitement charge adequately described, the question
of Simon Bikindi's potential liability will now be considered.
VI. "ONE WHO SINGS WITH HIS TONGUE ON FIRE": 69 THE RISE AND
(POTENTIAL) FALL OF SIMON BIKINDI
Simon Bikindi was born in a small village in the mountainous Gisenyi
region of Rwanda. 70 He came to music early in his life and became a prodigy
on the traditional instruments, the inanga and iningiri.17' As a performer,
Bikindi celebrated the music and dance of Rwanda.172 His performances, and
those of his group, the Irndirio Ballet, often blended traditional Rwandan
melody and dance with modem themes.1
7 1
Bikindi began work for the government at the early age of twenty-two in the
Ministry of Youth and Sports.174 His work for the Ministry continued until
after the government fled into Zaire in July of 1994.' 7 As a government
official, he was a member of President Habyarimana's political party, the
MRND. 176 According to the indictment against him, Bikindi was also one of
fifty original shareholders of RTLM. 177
168 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases, http://www.ictr.org
(follow link to "Cases," then "Status of Cases") (last visited June 20, 2007).
169 DYLAN, supra note 1.
170 McNeil, supra note 4.
171 Id.
172 Bikindi supplemented his work with the government by performing at weddings. His first
released cassette featured traditional Rwandan wedding songs. Id.
173 Id.
174 His post with the ministry involved organizing song and dance displays for visits from
honored guests. Id.
171 Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 17 (June 15,
2005).
176 See id. § II. The indictment alleges that Bikindi was a member of Habyarimana's MRND
party, and as such, participated in membership drives and training for the Interahamwe militias.
Id. 7. The indictment also alleges that the MRND instigated a "campaign to defeat the enemy,"
which included the use of Bikindi's music to sensitize Hutus to the slaughter of Tutsis. Id. 7,
10.
177 See Rwanda; The Genesis of a Killing Voice-RTLM, AFR. NEWS, Apr. 24, 2006. The
indictment also alleges that Bikindi conspired with President Habyarimana, Ferdinand
Nahimana, and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza to launch RTLM as an avenue for his music. Bikindi,
Case No. ICTR 01-72-I, Amended Indictment, 9.
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In the years leading up to the genocide, Bikindi was the most famous
musician in Rwanda, and many of his compositions called for Hutu
solidarity.178 These compositions, among them Nanga Abahutu (I Hate These
Hutus), Bene Sebahinzi (Sons of the Father of the Farmers), and Twasezereye
(We Said Good Bye to the Feudal Regime), were very popular both in Rwanda
and on the airwaves of RTLM. 179 Prior to the genocide, the songs were
broadcast a few times a day, but during the 100 days, RTLM repeatedly
broadcast the songs on an almost continuous loop. 8 In fact, Bikindi's voice
dominated the airwaves at a time when radio was one of the few ways for
Rwandans to receive any news."8' Bikindi himself was out of the country
when President Habyarimana was assassinated and did not return to Rwanda
until the 100 days was nearly over.'82
The prosecution alleges that Bikindi conspired with President Habyarimana
to compose music in order to desensitize the Rwandan public to the slaughter
of Tutsis.'83 Bikindi's most virulent song, Nanga Abahutu, calls out Hutus
who break rank to fight with Tutsis, and the prosecution alleges that this
message, like coded references in speeches given all over the country, was a
call to slaughter Tutsis.'84 In the song, Bikindi sings, "I hate these Hutus,...
who have renounced their identity .... and if I hate them, so much the
better."'8 5 There is no denying that the perpetrators of the genocide adopted
Bikindi's music and that his songs were broadcast on RTLM at a time when
it was advocating the slaughter of all remaining Tutsis in Rwanda.86 Under
178 Bikindi has been called the Michael Jackson of Rwanda. See McNeil, supra note 4.
179 Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, $ 14; McNeil, supra note 4.
Nowhere in the indictment does the prosecution say that Bikindi called for the extermination of
the Tutsi in his music, although there are allegations that Bikindi made statements on the radio
to that effect. See Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 33-40 (alleging that
Bikindi exhorted gatherings of Interahamwe to "work" (a coded reference to kill); that he stated
at a rally, "[s]ee how the Tutsi are exterminating you, the Hum. If you do not react right away
it's your fault"; that he called RTLM and reported on Hums who were stopping attacks on
Tutsis; and that he drove a vehicle with a public address system exhorting locals to "exterminate
quickly the remaining ones.").
180 Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 1 14.
's' McNeil, supra note 4.
182 Bikindi was in Europe to arrange a tour for his troupe, the Irndirio Ballet. Id.
183 The indictment alleges that Bikindi would compose and record a song with the financial
backing of the government, and then the song's content would have to be accepted by the
government. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 0 1-72-I, Amended Indictment, $T 12-13.
1- Id. $T 16, 40-41.
185 BIKINDI, supra note 2.
816 McNeil, supra note 4.
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Rwandan law, an artist can request that his song not be played on the air; the
prosecution alleges that Bikindi's failure to request that RTLM stop playing
his songs was a de facto acceptance of the radio station's genocidal program. '87
Bikindi's failure to stop the songs from being broadcast is at least
circumstantial evidence of his intent to incite genocide. During the time
leading up to the 100 days, Bikindi also performed the musical compositions
at rallies of the Interahamwe militias and at other government sponsored
events. 1
88
The singer responds to these allegations by arguing that the prosecution is
taking his songs out of context and that the songs were merely expressions of
his patriotic beliefs in Hum solidarity. 189  As far as performances at
Interahamwe rallies and government functions, Bikindi argues that as a
government official he was obliged to perform at those functions, and also, he
could not stop people from taking his musical expressions and turning them
into something that he did not intend. 90 Bikindi's former mistress claims that
he was not animated by hatred, but more by an opportunistic attempt to please
his bosses.' However, if the allegations of direct conduct during the genocide
contained in Bikindi's indictment prove to be true, then his argument that he
lacked genocidal intent will be seriously undercut.'92
In order to obtain a conviction, the Tribunal will consider the factors
elucidated in the Media Case: the purpose and content of the communication,
the context of the communication, and the relationship between the speaker
(here singer) and the subject. For the purpose analysis, the prosecution will
argue that Bikindi composed the songs with the intent and purpose of
... Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01 -72-1, Amended Indictment, 41.
188 In addition to desensitizing the populace to murder, the prosecution also argues that
Bikindi's performances were used as a recruitment tool for the Interahamwe. Id. 16 (alleging
that as a result of "the mobilizing effect" of Bikindi's music, a member of his dance troupe was
recruited into the Interahamwe and participated in killing Tutsis).
189 Bikindi's lawyer has stated that "Bikindi was only doing his citizen's duty. The country
had been invaded and as a good patriot, Bikindi urged people to mobilize against the
invaders .. " Simon Bikindi, Extremist Singer, INT'L JUST. TRIB.-ENGLISH, Sept. 11, 2006.
190 McNeil, supra note 4.
191 Bikindi's former mistress, herself a Tutsi, stated that when asked why he wrote Nanga
Abahutu, Bikindi replied, "[t]he government obliges me to write these songs. IfI hear the R.P.F.
is coming to Kigali next month, I'll write a song for them." Id.
192 In addition to alleging incitement to genocide through music, the indictment alleges that
Bikindi ordered the killing of several Tutsis and oversaw the killing of many more at the end of
the 100 days. See Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-I, Amended Indictment, 42-47. Bikindi
continued his support for the MRND after they fled to neighboring Zaire. Id. 17.
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inflaming the blood lust of the Hutus. As discussed earlier, the Tribunal does
not require a showing of direct consequences from the inciting remark in order
to convict, but will consider any direct effects in order to infer intent on the
part of the remarking party.'93 Here, however, the songs had been composed
and popularized for quite some time before the genocide occurred, and unlike
Akayesu's speech, it will be hard to find a direct link between the playing of
a song and an immediate act of genocide. It is necessary for the Tribunal to
find that Bikindi shared the genocidal intent of those committing the direct
acts.'94 However, if the prosecution proves that Bikindi took part in the
genocide, the Tribunal will likely infer Bikindi's intent to incite genocide
through his music.
It is likely that the court will reference the "poison" theory espoused in the
Streicher and Media Cases. Under this theory, the prosecution would argue
that like Streicher's anti-semitism and Kangura's/RTLM's inflammatory
attacks on Tutsis, Bikindi's music helped create an atmosphere conducive to
genocide that infected the minds of Rwandans. However, in both the Streicher
and Media Cases, the inciting remarks were much more direct, calling
specifically for the genocide to occur. Here, Bikindi at least has an argument
that his songs only rose to the level of Hans Fritzsche's news casts, merely
patriotic reflections of a country at war.'95
Application of the "poison" theory would also help the Tribunal answer any
argument by Bikindi that the only act of incitement that he committed during
the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal was failing to request that RTLM stop
playing his songs. As the court noted in the Media Case, it can consider
inciting remarks that fall outside the temporal jurisdiction of the court because
incitement is an inchoate offense that is not completed until the genocidal acts
occur. '96 This makes it likely that the court would consider the songs that were
written and recorded before January 1, 1994. Considering songs that were
written and performed before 1994 raises an interesting question regarding the
timing of intent. The prosecution must either argue that Bikindi had a
genocidal intent when he wrote or recorded the songs, or fallback on the theory
that Bikindi's main act of incitement was failing to request that RTLM stop
playing his music. However, it seems unlikely that Bikindi could have known
193 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR 99-52-T,
Judgment Summary, 89 (Dec. 3, 2003); see also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
194 See supra text accompanying note 144.
"9 This theory might explain why Bikindi has been defending his songs as patriotic
expressions. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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at the time he wrote this music what the climate in Rwanda would be in the
time immediately preceding and during the 100 days. The final spark that
ignited the genocide was the death of President Habyarimana, and it is
questionable if it would have been as widespread and deadly without this
occurrence. Nevertheless, the prosecution has alleged that Bikindi conspired
with Habyarimana on lyrics in an effort to desensitize the Hutu. 19 7 If the
prosecutor can prove this allegation, Bikindi's intent may be inferred.
The text of Bikindi's songs will also be a point of contention at his trial.
The prosecution alleges, and has experts to testify, that Bikindi's songs of
Hutu solidarity were essentially coded calls for the destruction of the Tutsi.' 98
However, unlike Akayesu, Kambanda, or Mugesera's comments, Bikindi's
songs could have more than one reasonable interpretation and do not seem
under any interpretation to directly call for the killing of anyone. It will be up
to the Tribunal to determine if a song of Hutu solidarity would be understood
to be a coded reference to killing Tutsis.' 99 Alison DesForges, a Rwandan
specialist for Human Rights Watch, in speaking about the Bikindi case, noted
that many things in Rwanda have a hidden subtext and pointed out a Rwandan
proverb that states, "[a] message is given to many, but those who are meant to
understand, understand."2 °°
The Tribunal will also have to consider, as it did in Akayesu and the Media
Case, the context in which Bikindi's music was heard. The atmosphere in
Rwanda at the time of the composition of Bikindi's music was incredibly
unstable. Bikindi's songs, although potentially innocuous in a vacuum, were
often broadcast following or preceding calls for attacks on Tutsis.2°' The
context of composition seems to favor the prosecution's case, although Bikindi
argues that the context is what inspired him to compose the songs. Bikindi
claims that songs like Nanga Abahutu were merely reflections of the times in
which he was living, and their misuse or appropriation by those committing the
genocide was beyond his control." 2
Finally, the Tribunal must consider the viewpoint of the speaker of the
inciting remark and will give more deference to an expression of a minority or
oppressed group. A song like Nanga Abahutu seems to be an expression of a
97 Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-I, Amended Indictment, 13.
198 See Simon Bikindi, Extremist Singer, supra note 189.
'9 As in the Akayesu and Media Case, the prosecution intends to call experts to testify that
the songs were in fact coded references to killing Tutsis. Id.
200 McNeil, supra note 4.
201 Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-1, Amended Indictment, 41.
202 McNeil, supra note 4.
[Vol. 35:645
"DISILLUSIONED WORDS LIKE BULLETS BARK"
majority group. However, Bikindi could argue that, like Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza's speech describing the discrimination faced by his parents at the
hands of the then Tutsi ruling class, Bikindi's music is merely an expression
of the frustration felt by Hutus because of their past discrimination, and
therefore more deserving of protection. This argument would certainly seem
to be a stretch as Bikindi's music, while reflective of past discrimination,
focused on the current role that the Hutu played in Rwandan culture, that of the
controlling majority group.
Based on the considered precedent and the context in which Bikindi
performed and composed his music, it seems likely that Bikindi will be
convicted of incitement to commit genocide through his music. Bikindi's trial
is ongoing and a verdict could come 2007, although any appeal of the case
would certainly take years.
VII. "SOMETHING IS HAPPENING HERE BUT You DON'T KNOW WHAT IT
IS":2° 3 REVERBERATIONS FROM A MUSICIAN'S TRIAL
This Note has endeavored to trace the evolution of the charge of incitement
to genocide and its potential application in the case of Simon Bikindi. Neither
of these paths reach the ultimate question that was posed at the beginning of
this undertaking: whether it is appropriate to charge a musician for inciting
genocide through his music. In Bikindi's case, it seems unlikely that anyone
would argue that he is an individual who should be lauded for his actions. At
best, Bikindi's behavior smacks of nearly criminal short-sightedness, and at
worst, reflects a calculated attempt to wipe an ethnic group off of the planet.
Considering the question ofBikindi's guilt illustrates the grey areas that are
present in almost all incitement cases. The case raises the issues that underlie
every incitement case: at what point can a person's statement be considered to
have caused another's actions, and how direct must those statements be so that
society as a whole feels comfortable in finding culpability. In Diane
Orentlicher's critique of the Media Case, she notes that since the Media Case
was decided in 2002, the Committee to Protect Journalists has documented
close to fifty cases of governments using claims of ethnic divisionism to
silence journalists.2"'
The mere fact that Bikindi has been charged in this case could lead to a
backlash against musicians who arguably support one ethnic, political, or
203 BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man, on HIGHWAY61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965).
24 Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 593.
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social group over another. Considering that Bikindi's songs are characterized
by the prosecution as only songs of Hutu solidarity and not direct calls for the
killing of Tutsis, a large range of potential music could be affected.
However, the ICTR has the opportunity to craft its decision in the Bikindi
case in a way that would protect freedom of expression. By stressing the
context in which Bikindi wrote and performed these songs and his position of
influence with Rwandans, the Tribunal can limit the potential impact of any
conviction. It was not the fact that Bikindi merely wrote and performed this
music that made his actions potentially criminal. Rather, it was the message
of the songs, combined with their presentation amidst calls for outright
genocide on the airwaves of RTLM and at gatherings of the Interahamwe that
made Bikindi's music so deadly.
Furthermore, the ICTR should reconsider the necessity of a direct link
between the inciting remark and an act of genocide when the remarks are
indirect. All of the ICTR's previous convictions for incitement presented
direct links between the inciting remark and acts of genocide, yet the Tribunal
in the Media Case chose to state that no direct link was necessary between the
remark and the genocidal act. Also, in all previous cases, the inciting remarks
were clearly understood to be references to the killing of Tutsis. In cases
where the remarks are ambiguous, and therefore more likely to be
misinterpreted by a pro-censorship government, it may be necessary to re-
incorporate the direct effects test that was adopted in Akayesu and disregarded
in the Media Case. This holds true in the case of most forms of artistic
expression. If the Tribunal finds that Bikindi's music was understood to be a
call for the murder of Tutsis, then the lower standard should be applied in his
case; but it is important for the Tribunal to note the potential effect that
Bikindi's conviction could have on the freedom of expression and temper its
jurisprudence accordingly.
In the final analysis, it seems clear that there is a difference between Bob
Dylan's songs of protest and Simon Bikindi's songs of Hutu solidarity. While
Dylan wrote songs that called for change in an atmosphere of political unrest,
America in the 1960s was a far cry from Rwanda in 1994. Dylan's music
protested injustice and suffering and plead for positive change while Bikindi
was an opportunistic exploiter of hatred and animus. Any conclusion to the
contrary would downplay the deaths of close to one million people.
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